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This study investigated the effects of retrieval 
context on memory for social actions which varied in their 
degree of consistency and inconsistency with established 
social prototypes. The pattern of recall of these actions 
was found to vary as a function of retrieval context (i.e., 
cued versus free recall tests). The results do not support 
a model of memory employing cognitive effort as a mediator 
of social memory. They were interpreted within a shared 
and distinctive featural analysis. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of social psychology is firmly grounded in 
issues concerning how individuals may differ from groups. 
Naturally, this concern is also present in the relatively 
young area of social cognition. Since the field of social 
cognition is fundamentally concerned with the nature, 
acquisition, and representation of social information in 
the mind of the individual, the issue of individual vs. 
group differences has been approached from a somewhat 
different perspective. This perspective leads to questions 
such as how presenting information in an individual vs. 
group context may lead to differences in the manner in 
which an individual processes that information (e.g., Wyer 
& Gordon, 1980). An additional question arises as to how 
representations of group information may differ from 
representations of information about an individual (e.g., 
Srull, 1985). 
A growing body of research suggests that there are 
important differences between these two contexts. One area 
in which this difference is especially apparent is in the 
research on memory for behavioral consistency (e.g., Hastie 
& Kumar, 1979; Hamilton, Katz & Leirer, 1980; Wyer & 
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Gordon, 1982). In the typical paradigm, subjects are given 
a list of traits attributed to a fictitious individual and 
are then presented with behavioral descriptions of the 
individual in the context of an impression formation task. 
The descriptions are either consistent, inconsistent or 
irrelevant with subjects' trait-based expectancies. 
Incidental memory for these behaviors is then assessed with 
a free-recall test. The typical finding is that behaviors 
which are inconsistent with subjects' expectancies are 
better recalled than either consistent or irrelevant 
behaviors (e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Hamilton et al., 
1 9 8 0 ) .  
This effect is attributed to the increased processing 
time devoted to inconsistency. Behaviors which are 
inconsistent with expectancies are assumed to be thought 
about more extensively than other kinds of behaviors. 
Individuals are motivated to reconcile the incongruity of 
these actions which necessitates more effortful processing 
(e.g., Hastie, 1984). This entails the maintenance of the 
item in working memory. In working memory, interitem 
associations among the inconsistent action and other 
contiguously present information are established. These 
interitem associations then provide multiple retrieval 
routes for the subsequent recall of inconsistent items 
which are not available for more explicable or expected 
3 
information (e.g., Hastie, 1984; Srull, 1981; Wyer & Srull, 
1980). 
Initially, the only published exception to this 
general finding was a study by Rothbart, Evans & Fulero 
(1979) in which subjects tended to recall more expectancy-
consistent than evaluatively similar but trait irrelevant 
behaviors; there was apparently no difference between 
subjects recall of expectancy-inconsistent and evaluatively 
similar but expectancy-unrelated behavior. Although there 
were differences in the types of data analyses performed in 
the Rothbart et al. and Hastie studies (see Hastie, Park & 
Weber, 1984; Crocker, Hannah & Weber, 1983; Srull, 1981), 
it appears that the more critical difference in the two 
paradigms is the fact that in the Rothbart et al. study, 
the subjects were given an expectation about the 
characteristics of a group of individuals rather than a 
single individual (e.g., Srull, 1981; Stern, Marrs, Millar 
& Cole, 1984; Wyer & Gordon, 1982). When behavioral 
inconsistency was described in the context of an individual 
expectancy, these items were highly memorable, but when 
behavioral inconsistency was presented in the context of a 
"loose-knit" group of individuals, no recall advantage was 
observed (e.g., Srull, 1981, Stern et al., 1985). These 
findings suggest that individuals hold different 
expectations about the homogeneity of an individual's 
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behaviors versus groups. This difference in expectancies 
then determines the extent to which the individual attempts 
to reconcile the perceived inconsistency at input. Since 
the mechanism presumably responsible for recall is the 
establishment of interitem associations at input, memory 
for evaluatively inconsistent items should be poor under 
these conditions. This reasoning is supported by the 
finding that under such conditions, consistent information 
is more memorable than inconsistency (e.g., Srull, 1983; 
Srull, Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1985). Under conditions 
in which subjects' motivation to reduce inconsistency is 
minimized (e.g., presentation of inconsistency in the 
context of nonmeaningful vs. meaningful groups), consistent 
item recall is superior. Srull et al. (1985) suggest that 
in the absence of such effortful processing, retrieval is 
guided by the superordinate cues embodied in the initial 
expectancy. Since consistent information is more strongly 
associated with the superordinate, consistency is more 
accessible in the associative networks. 
In sum, the literature on memory for information 
varying in its consistency with individual's expectations 
emphasizes the importance of individual vs. group 
processing contexts. The importance of this factor is in 
the contextual initiation of processes establishing 
interitem associative bonds. When the context initiates 
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this process (by promoting reconciliation of inconsistency) 
subsequent retrieval will be guided by these multiple 
retrieval routes and inconsistent item recall will be 
facilitated. In the absence of an initiation of this 
process, retrieval will be guided by the strength of 
association between items and their superordinate and 
consistent item recall will be favored. 
A shared and distinctive featural analysis offers a 
different conceptualization of these issues. Social 
actions can be conceptualized as sets of features which 
differ on several important dimensions. One featural 
dimension which may be critical for an account of an 
action's memorability is the extent to which the event's 
features are shared by other events in a complex episode. 
A shared feature is one which is held in common by two or 
more events within an episode. A distinctive feature 
defines the unique aspects of the item in its episodic 
context. It composes the nonoverlapping informationsl 
content of a given set. For example, if one reads a 
description of an individual making racist statements in a 
bar, specific features implied by this action are activated 
in the process of comprehension. These features are likely 
to also be activated if one reads that the individual is a 
member of the KKK. These features would not be redundantly 
activated if one reads that the individual is a nun. So, 
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consistency can be conceptualized as the extent to which an 
item holds features in common with a prototype. Consistent 
items share features in common with a prototype whereas 
inconsistent items do not share features in common with a 
prototype. This is one dimension by which consistency and 
inconsistency can be distinguished. However, a shared 
featural dimension does not totally capture the distinction 
between consistency and inconsistency. Although consistent 
and inconsistent actions may imply features which are not 
shared by with a prototype (i.e., distinctive features), 
inconsistent items are unique in that their distinctive 
features are ususally bi-polar opposites of the implied 
features of the prototype. This is not the case for 
consistent items. Consistent items may have features which 
are not shared by all exemplars of a class or may vary in 
their typicality as examples of prototypical behavior 
(e.g., professors teaching a class vs. winning a national 
teaching award), but the evaluative implications of the 
non-shared features are not different from the evaluative 
implications of the category. When the evaluative 
implication of the behavior is opposite to that of the 
prototype, the behavior is inconsistent (e.g., a professor 
failing a reading test). The features implied by the 
action are not shared with the prototype and are 
evaluatively opposite to that of the prototype. As such, 
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inconsistent actions are likely to be more distinctive in 
relation to the prototype than are consistent actions. 
An analysis of events into their composit features has 
important implications for retrieval. First, retrieval 
will depend upon the extent to which the encoding of shared 
and distinctive features has been encouraged at input (Hunt 
& Einstein, 1981; Hunt & Seta, 1983)* If the context has 
encouraged the encoding of shared features, a potential 
method of delineating the search set from which the target 
can be drawn is available. That is, since shared features 
are inherently common to several events within an episode, 
the activation of such features at the time of retrieval 
delineates a large subset of encoded events within memory. 
This factor alone would not produce optimal memory for the 
item, however. Optimal memory would require a method of 
discriminating the target event from other similar items 
within the set. Activation of shared features cannot serve 
this important function since they only establish the 
commonalities among items. Activation of the distinctive 
features of the target event can serve this function since 
they specify the event's uniqueness. Thus, activation of 
distinctive features at retrieval serves a discriminatory 
function and provides a mechanism for the precise 
specification of the target event. 
Retrieval is viewed as a process of specifying a 
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particular feature set within memory. Shared and 
distinctive feature activation serve complimentary 
functions within this process. The activation of shared 
features directs the retrieval search to a subset of 
similar events within memory, whereas, the activation of 
distinctive features provides information necessary to 
discriminate the target from other members of the set. 
Thus, both types of features are important for effective 
recall. Optimal recall results from conditions which 
encourage the processing and subsequent activation of an 
item's shared and distinctive features. 
Since optimal recall depends upon the presence of both 
shared and distinctive features, it follows that neither 
consistency nor inconsistency will be recalled optimally 
without the supplementation of additional feature content 
at encoding. That is, without additional attentional 
direction to distinctive aspects of a consistent item, its 
memory representation may be weighted by shared features. 
Thus, the set in which the item is represented will be 
accessible via a reactivation of these shared features at 
retrieval but information necessary to aid in its 
discrimination from other member of the set will be absent. 
Encoding conditions which establish the presence of 
distinctive features would then be optimal for recall of 
consistent information. Conversely, encoding conditions 
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which establish the presence of shared features will 
produce optimal recall of inconsistent items. This is the 
case since in the absence of shared features, a method of 
accessing the target set is unavailable to a guided 
retrieval process. Thus, optimal recall of consistent 
actions will be determined by the establishment and 
reactivation of distinctive features and optimal recall of 
inconsistent actions will be determined by the 
establishment and reactivation of shared features. A 
number of studies which support this reasoning have been 
conducted. Memory for both consistent and inconsistent 
information was seen to depend upon the extent to which 
encoding conditions promoted the processing of shared and 
distinctive features. In one study, memory for consistent 
information was superior when subjects were given 
instructions to concentrate upon the differences between 
behavioral descriptions and group prototypes (distinctive 
feature processing) whereas, memory for inconsistent 
information was superior when subjects were directed to 
detect the similarities between items and the prototypes 
(shared feature processing) (Seta & Hunt, 1983). 
The relative recall of consistent and inconsistent 
information was also found to be dependent upon the 
availability of effective retrieval cues at output (Seta & 
Hunt, 1985). Retrieval cues facilitate event memory 
whenever they reactivate features which were extracted 
during the input stage of information processing. If one 
considers the shared set of features among items to 
constitute a part of the prototypical representation of a 
category, (Tversky, 1977)> then prototypical cues should 
facilitate the reactivation of shared features. This 
reactivation should be especially important for recall of a 
distinctive item since it would provide nonredundant access 
to the set of items in memory within which the behavior is 
represented. Thus, when attention to shared features has 
been promoted at input, the presence of a prototype cue 
should facilitate the recall of inconsistency. In the 
absence of attentional direction to shared features, 
inconsistent actions should be poorly recalled when cued 
with the prototype: the cue would not effectively activate 
the shared features necessary to delineate the item's 
representational subset. Under the latter circumstances, 
consistent information should demonstrate a memorial 
advantage since this type of behavior by definition shares 
features in common with the prototype and is, therefore, 
acce&sible in retrieval. 
These ideas were supported in a study in which the 
probability of processing shared features was varied by 
directing subjects to either explain the actions of group 
members based on their actions or directing them to simply 
form an impression of the group members based upon the 
actions. Explain orientation was assumed to facilitate the 
processing of shared features since in order to explain an 
action, the action must be considered in relation to 
prototypical knowledge of causes of behavior. Providing 
adequate justification should establish shared features 
between this prototypical information and the action. An 
impression judgment does not require attention to 
commonalities between the action and the prototype since it 
may be based solely on the properties of the action (e.g., 
its valence). Thus, when cued with a prototype, recall of 
consistent information was superior under impression 
orientation conditions, whereas, recall of inconsistent 
information was superior under explain orientation 
conditions. Neither type of information demonstrated a 
memorial advantage when cued with a nonprototypical cue 
(i.e., a proper name). This study suggests that the 
availability of shared and distinctive information at input 
and output are critical factors to be considered in the 
analysis of memory for consistent and inconsistent social 
information. 
The following study will serve to extend this analysis 
in several important ways. First, it is designed to 
determine the degree to which individual's ability to 
provide adequate justification for a behavior's 
inconsistency is necessary for inconsistent item memory. 
Secondly, it is designed to extend the scope of the 
research program by studying memory for consistency which 
varies in typicality. In addition, the study is designed 
to assess the relationship between cued and free recall in 
this paradigm. 
Recall of actions varying in degree of consistency and 
inconsistency 
Items which vary in their degree of inconsistency with 
a prototype should be differentially distinctive and 
explicable. That is, behaviors which are slightly 
inconsistent should be less distinctive and easier to 
explain than moderately inconsistent actions. Actions 
which are highly inconsistent with an established prototype 
may be highly distinctive but not explicable at all. It 
may be impossible to find adequate justification for 
actions that are extremely discrepant from prototypical 
expectations. 
These differences in the actions' explicability have 
important implications for their memorability. From this 
approach, providing adequate justification for an action's 
inconsistency serves to establish featural overlap between 
the action and the prototype. This featural overlap can 
then function within retrieval as a basis for delimiting 
the call of events in memory from which the item can be 
potentially discerned. If an action is not adequately 
explained, no featural overlap between the prototype and 
item will be established. Thus, no shared features between 
the action and prototype will be present in the 
representation of the item in memory. So, when cued with a 
prototype, memory for these highly inconsistent actions 
will be poor. 
This prediction is based upon the prototype cue's 
ability to provide access to the representation of the 
actions via the activation of shared features. Thus, 
memory search is constrained to the subset of items in 
memory which share overlapping features with the prototype 
cue. In this context, a cue's effectiveness will depend 
upon its ability to access shared item features. If the 
experimenter-provided cue does not share features in common 
with the item, it will be undiagnostic and ineffective. In 
contrast, free recall allows for subjects' self-generation 
of cues at output. Therefore, it is possible that more 
effective cues can be generated by subjects when they are 
not constrained by experimenter-provided cues. If so, the 
pattern of recall results would be likely to change in a 
free recall paradigm. 
Specifically, recall may be a direct function of the 
degree of inconsistency in free recall. This would be 
likely if subjects, in their attempt to explain the action, 
relate the item to nonexperimentally presented prototypical 
information. For example, it is likely that subjects will 
generate the prototype of which the action is typical when 
the action is encoded. One may spontaneously generate 
"rapist" when one reads that a minister raped a six-year 
old. If so, at the time of recall, one may generate 
"rapist" as a cue and thereby, access this category of 
information. In the context of its presentation as an 
unexpected action of a minister, the action may acquire a 
distinctive component within the rapist category. It may 
then be discriminable among other "rape" actions within 
this category. 
This conjecture has some empirical base in a 
nonsignificant trend for changes in items* perceived 
inconsistency following explain condition orientation 
(Seta, 1983)• It is probable that any added 
distinctiveness derived from the context of presentation 
should carry over to a free recall test. Thus, if subjects 
are able to generate the nonpresented prototype as a cue, 
then these highly inconsistent actions may be highly 
memorable in free recall. If so, a positive relationship 
between degree of inconsistency and free recall may be 
observed. The more inconsistent an item, the more distinct 
it should be in the retrieval context. 
These predictions are counter to that made by the 
associative approach prevalent in the person memory 
literature. From this perspective, the function of 
explanation is to induce the maintenance of the item in 
working memory for a sufficient duration to establish 
inter-episodic associative links. The mechanism of 
association in this context is contiguity. Thus, the 
harder an item is to explain, the longer it should persist 
in working memory and the more inter-item associations 
should be built around the item. From this perspective, 
then, there should be a direct, positive relationship 
between items' degree of inconsistency and memory, as 
tested by free or cued recall. 
Predictions about the free recall and cued recall of 
consistent actions are straightforward from a featural 
analysis. Free recall is assumed to rely heavily upon the 
availability of relational information. In cued recall 
access of relational information is insured by presentation 
of the cue (e.g., Hunt & Einstein, 1981). Free recall 
requires the self-generation of relational information as a 
first step in retrieval. Cued recall facilitates this 
process by supplying the necessary activation of relational 
information and for this reason, it is usually considered 
an "easier" memory test. 
Items which share a predominance of features in common 
with a prototype (e.g., consistent actions) have available 
the relational information necessary to begin the retrieval 
process in either cued or free recall. Consistent actions 
may be rich in shared featural content, but they may be 
relatively impoverished in distinctiveness. Thus, with 
shared featural overlap held constant, low consistency 
items may be more memorable than highly consistent, but 
less distinctive, actions. Thus, under conditions which 
promote the processing of shared features, low consistency 
actions may be more memorable than high consistency items. 
That is, an inverse relationship between degree of 
consistency and recall may be obtained when retrieval is 
tested in free or cued recall context. This prediction is 
contrary to that made from an associative approach. Since 
consistency is conceptualized as an item's strength of 
association with a prototype, there should be a positive 
relationship between degree of consistency and recall in 
either context. 
The present study attempts to extend understanding of 
issues within person memory in several ways. First, rather 
than manipulating subject's expectancies by attributing 
actions to groups or individuals, normative data were 
gathered which allows for the a priori assignment of 
behaviors to different levels of prototypical consistency 
(i.e., low, moderate, and high levels of consistency and 
inconsistency). This allows for a more precise delineation 
of the role subjects' expectations play in mediating the 
memory effects described above while eliminating any 
extraneous variables associated with assigning behaviors to 
groups vs. individuals. Secondly, rather than 
concentrating upon conditions of encoding as has typically 
been the case, this study will consider the nature of the 
context in which individuals are asked to remember the 
behaviors (i.e., the retrieval context). 
Theoretically, the pattern of recall found across 
different types of retrieval contexts will help distinguish 
between these two competing accounts of the memory 
mechanisms underlying the observed effects of behavioral 
consistency. In this study, all subjects will be oriented 
to process the expectancy-consistent and inconsistent 
actions in an identical manner; only the conditions of 
retrieval will vary across conditions. Half of the 
subjects will be asked to write down all of the actions 
they read about (i.e., free recall), whereas half will be 
asked to write down the actions beneath the social group 
heading with which they were paired (i.e., cued recall). 
The actions presented will vary in consistency and 
inconsistency with established prototypes. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Selection of Stimulus Materials 
Normative data were collected by means of a three step 
procedure. In the first phase, MO trait adjectives were 
drawn from Anderson's (1968) Norms. Half were positive 
(within the top 20%) and half were negative (within the 
bottom 20%). Forms were constructed in which the 
adjectives were listed beneath 13 socially desirable and 
undesirable groups (e.g., nurses and KKK members). These 
traits were listed again beneath 108 socially desirable and 
socially undesirable behavioral descriptions selected from 
Rothbart's (1979) normative ratings of social desirability. 
Subjects were instructed to circle the traits they felt 
were characteristic of the group or actions. 235 subjects 
completed the group ratings and an average of 17 subjects 
circled traits for each of the behaviors. 
Traits for which 55% or more of the subjects agreed 
(i.e., thought were characteristic of the group or 
behavior) were drawn from this pool and were considered to 
be stable traits of the group or behavior. Trait overlap 
between behavior and group was determined by computing the 
percentage of traits held in common by the group and 
behavior. 
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In the second phase, a pool of 86 behaviors were drawn 
for additional ratings. These behaviors were described as 
being peformed by a group member and subjects were asked to 
rate the action's consistency with their expectation of 
typical group behavior along a 9 point scale. 103 subjects 
participated in this phase. A total of 18-23 subjects 
rated each behavior. 
In the third phase, 3 consistent and 3 inconsistent 
were drawn from the pool above. Consistency was determined 
by the percentage of trait overlap between behavior and 
group. Consistency was considered to be a 90-100% overlap 
of traits; inconsistency was no overlap between behavior 
and trait. 
Level of consistency was determined from the 
consistency ratings obtained in step 2. The nine point 
scale was divided into intervals defining consistency 
levels such that ratings of 8-9 defined high consistency, 
6.5-7.5 defined moderate consistency, 5-6 defined low 
consistency and 4-5 defined low inconsistency, 2.5-3.5 
defined moderate inconsistency and 1-2 defined high 
inconsistency. 
Using these criteria, a behavior meeting the overlap 
and level criteria was assigned to the six levels of 
consistency for each of six social groups. This produces a 
list of 36 actions; a low, moderate, and high consistency 
action and a low, moderate, and high inconsistency action 
for six social groups. 
Each of the 36 items was typed on a separate paper and 
presented to subjects in a randomized order. Two random 
orders were constructed and equalized across groups. 
Control condition lists were constructed. These lists were 
identical to the experimental lists with the exception that 
the words "a person" were substituted for the name of the 
social group performing the actions. 
Subjects and Design 
The design consists of two between group factors and 
two within-subjects factors. The between factors are 
treatment (experimental and control) and test-type (free 
recall and cued recall). The within-subjects factors are 
consistency (consistent and inconsistent actions as defined 
by trait overlap) and level (low, moderate, and high 
consistency and inconsistency as defined by ratings). 
Thus, the design isa2x2x2x3 between-within group 
factorial. 
Sixteen subjects were assigned to each between-group 
conditions resulting in a total of 64 subjects. Subjects 
participated in groups of 2-4 members and received partial 
credit towards fulfillment of course requirements. 
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Procedure 
Subjects were told that they were participating in a 
project directed toward the understanding of various 
aspects of social perception and that there were several 
parts of the study. They were informed that the first part 
of the study involved exploring some characteristics of 
social information. Then, a tape recorder describing their 
task was played. The recording indicated that their task 
was to explain why various actions were performed; that, 
they would be presented with a list of actions and that 
they should think of an explanation for the action. After 
thinking of an explanation they should give a rating as to 
how hard it was to come up with the explanation. A rating 
scale was given them, which contained a 9 point scale 
indicating degrees of effort. They were directed to give a 
rating as to the amount of effort spent in formulating 
their explanation. If they were not able to come up with 
an explanation, they were directed to indicate the degree 
of effort they had spent in trying to formulate an 
explanation. Five subjects in each cell were told to 
circle yes or no to indicate whether they were able to 
explain the action, whereas, the remaining 11 subjects were 
told to give a brief account of their explanation. In both 
cases, the effort ratings were made after this task. 
Subjects were paced through these tasks at a rate of 30 
sec. per action. They were directed to read, explain, and 
rate each action within the allotted time without going 
ahead or getting behind the recorded timer. 
After completing this input stage, booklets and rating 
forms were collected. At this time, either a free recall 
or cued recall test was given. In free recall, subjects 
were instructed to list all of the actions in a column on a 
blank sheet of paper. In cued recall, subjects were 
directed to list the actions they read about beneath the 
group heading which was paired with the group. In the cued 
recall-control condition, subjects were told to list the 
actions beneath the group they felt the action belonged 
with (as noted, in the control condition, no group 
membership was mentioned at input). Subjects in these 
cued-recall conditions were given a sheet of paper 
containing the six social group readings. Recall was 
limited to ten minutes in all conditions. Following this 
task, subjects were debriefed and thanked. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The initial analysis consisted of an ANOVA conducted 
upon the full design including the control group. The 
purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the 
pattern of recall in the control group differed from that 
in the experimental group. 
This analysis-revealed several significant effects. 
The analysis revealed a main effect of test F( 1,60)=111.04, 
p<.05 and of treatment F(1,60)=45.86, p<.05. More 
importantly, this analysis revealed several interactions 
involving the control group [test by treatment 
F(1,60)=49.74, consistency by treatment F(1,60)=5.22 and a 
marginally significant (p<.10) test by treatment by degree 
F(2,120)=3.42] and an additional interaction of test by 
consistency by degree F(2,120)=7.27. The presence of these 
interactions suggests that the pattern of recall in the 
control group differs from that of the experimental group. 
Newman-Keuls post-hoc comparisons of cell means (see 
Table 1) within the control group revealed differences 
between the means of free and cued recall conditions across 
all levels of consistency and inconsistency. Free recall 
was always better than cued recall. This is expected since 
in order for an item to be scored as correct recall in the 
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cued recall vs free recall conditions, the item had to be 
paired with the correct group label. Since the group label 
was not presented at input in the control group, the 
likelihood of correctly pairing the item with the group is 
determined only by chance and guessing factors. 
Consistent with this reasoning, the only other 
signficant differences found in the control group were 
differences among the means of low, moderate and high 
consistent item cued recall. As can be seen from Table 1, 
recall was an increasing function of level of consistency. 
This finding supports the validity of the level of 
consistency manipulation in that subjects were able to 
differentially match low, moderate, and high consistency 
items with their group prototype even under conditions in 
which these group-item relationships were not presented at 
input. These means reflect the ability of subjects to 
guess the likely pairing of items to group prototypes. As 
such, the means reflect a guessing bias, not memory, and 
will be usded as a correction for guessing in further 
analyses in order to more accurately reflect memory 
processes per se. 
Since the pattern of recall in the control group only 
differed as a function of the demand and ability to 
correctly match remembered information in recall, further 
analyses only considered experimental group data. A 2x2x3 
ANOVA was conducted on the between factor of test (free and 
cued recall) and within factors of consistency (consistent 
and inconsistent) and level (low, moderate, and high) 
experimental design (see Table 2). This analysis revealed 
a main effect of test F(1,30)=5.28, p<.05. This main 
effect is due to overall superior recall in the free recall 
test condition. This main effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction amont test, consistency, and level 
F(2,60)=8.47, p<.001. Orthogonal comparisons among cell 
means were conducted to determine the nature of this 
interaction. 
In the experimental free recall conditions, high 
inconsistency actions were better recalled (p<.10) than low 
inconsistent actions (moderate inconsistent action recall 
did not differe from low or high inconsistent action 
recall). This finding is consistent with both associative 
and featureal analyses. From an associative perspective 
(e.g., Wyer & Srull, 1981), highly inconsistent actions 
should be more unexpected and should occupy more processing 
resources at input than less inconsistent items. Thus, a 
relatively greater number of interitem associative bonds 
should be established at input which would facilitate their 
access at output. Recall should be an increasing function 
of degree of inconsistency from an associative perspective. 
From the featureal analysis described above, recall of 
highly inconsistent actions should be very good under there 
conditions. 
Attempting to explain the incongruenty actions of 
group members should promote the activation of the features 
of the prototype and features implied by the action. A 
comparison of these features reveal a marked discrepancy 
under conditions in which the evaluative implications of 
each are in opposition. This comparison then adds a 
distinctive component to the encoded representation of the 
action. Under conditions in which subjects are free to 
generate their own retrieval cues (i.e., free recall), 
recall of an item should be facilitated by this added 
distinctiveness. Thus, recall should increase as a 
function of degree of inconsistency. 
A different prediction is made under conditions in 
which the output format is constrained by requirements to 
match items to presented cues. Under these conditions, 
correct recall is dependent upon a cue's ability to access 
features shared with the to-be-remembered item. That is, 
encoding conditions must have promoted the activation 
and/or discovery of features of the item which overlap with 
the cue's features. This establishes a basis for the 
generation of relational information between cue and item 
and, thus, allows for cued access in this retrieval 
context. If no overlapping featural similarity has been 
established, the cue will not access the item. Thus, the 
cue's function in promoting successful recall will depend 
upon the initiation of processes establishing item-cue 
overlap at input. 
Explanation of inconsistency is one type of process 
which should promote the establishment of overlap between 
the group cue and the action since it requires the 
generation of extensive prototypical knowledge to use as a 
basis for causal attributions. When a successful basis for 
explanation has been found, featural overlap between the 
prototype and the action has been established. The 
presentation of the cue would then access the inconsistent 
item. Therefore, cued recall of inconsistency should 
depend upon subjects' ability to explain the actions. When 
actions are highly inconsistent, successful explanation is 
unlikely. Therefore, cued recall of highly inconsistent 
actions may be poor. Consistent with this reasoning, high 
inconsistent actions were recalled significantly worse 
(p<.01) than either low or moderate inconsistent items in 
the cued recall condition (see Table 2). And high 
inconsistent items were better recalled in free recall than 
in cued recall (p<.01). No difference between recall at 
other levels of inconsistency was found across free and 
cued recall. 
Although the typical paradigm in the person memory 
area utilizes a free recall test (e.g., Srull, 1981; Srull 
et al., 1985), from the predominant associative 
perspective, the mechanisms of retrieval in both cued and 
free recall are identical. Retrieval in free recall is 
assumed to originate at the subject node at the highest 
level of the associative network (e.g., group prototype). 
A cue simply directs entry into this network, at which time 
the retrieval search proceeds in the same manner as in free 
recall. Thus, the pattern of recall should be identical in 
both free and cued recall. This was clearly not the case 
in this study. 
In cued recall (uncorrected for guessing), low (p<.10) 
and high (p<,05) consistent actions were better recalled 
than moderately consistent actions. When guessing 
corrections were made (the mean of the cued recall-control 
group scores were substracted from the corresponding 
experimental group means), only the low consistency actions 
were better recalled than moderate and high consistency 
items (p<.05). The difference between these two analyses 
reflect the ability of subjects to guess the correct 
pairing of highly consistent actions and groups in this 
setting. When this factor is included, moderate consistent 
items are recalled worse than either high or low 
consistency; when this factor is excluded, high consistent 
items were not recalled better than either moderate or low 
consistency. 
The findings of either analysis are inconsistent with 
predictions which would be made from an associative 
perspective. In this view, consistency is conceptualized 
as the strenth of association between an item and a 
prototype. Highly consistent items should be stronger 
associates of the prototype than either moderate or low 
consistent items. In this study, an accepted method of 
establishing strength of association was used in the 
assignement of items to levels of consistency (i.e., the 
typicality of an action with respect to group behavior was 
varied such that high consistent actions were rated as more 
expected than low or moderate actions). The mechanism of 
retrieval vis a vis consistency in the associative 
framework is strength of association (e.g., Srull, 1981). 
Thus, strong associates of a prototype (i.e., high 
consistency items) should be recalled better than weaker 
associates (i.e., low and moderate consistent items). As 
can be seen from Table 2, this was not the case in either 
the corrected vs uncorrected analysis. 
The results of the free recall condition with respect 
to consistent item recall is also inconsistent with an 
associative perspective. As discussed above, the function 
of a cue is to direct entry at the highest node in an 
associative network established at encoding. Retrieval 
originates at the highest level of the network (e.g., 
Srull, 1981). When an integrated impression set is 
established at input (e.g., directions to explain the 
actions of group members), consistent items are assumed to 
be thought about in relation to the examplified concepts 
and the actions are assumed to be directly associated to a 
control (trait, person or group) node (e.g., Wyer & Gordon, 
1985). Thus, free recall would originate at this highest, 
central node. Thus strongly associated, high consistent, 
actions shoudl be recalled better than less consistent 
actions. Yet, in this study, low consistent actions tended 
to be recalled better than either moderate (p<.25) or high 
(p<.10) consistent actions under conditions of free recall. 
Low consistent actions were better recalled than the 
combined means of the moderate and high consistent action 
recall conditions (p<.05). 
These results are expected from a featural analysis. 
The featural overlap between the group prototype was held 
relatively constant across all levels of consistency. This 
factor should ensure the availability of relational 
information among items and group prototypes in both 
retrieval contexts (i.e., free and cued recall). Thus, 
recall of the actions should be a direct function of an 
action's distinctiveness since the critical factor would be 
the action's discriminability among similar members of the 
related set. So consistent actions were rated as less 
typical group actions than were high and moderate 
consistent actions. Therefore, they were assumed to be 
more distinctive in the context of group behavior. Recall 
of these acrtions was therefore predicted to be superior in 
both cued and free recall contexts. As can be seen from 
Table 2, this pattern of recall is supportive of this 
reasoning. 
In sum, the pattern of recall obtained in both free 
and cued recall conditions is inconsistent with the 
prevalent associative memory model. Specifically, these 
data do not support the notion that differences in 
allocated capacity, and the corresponding induction of 
associative bonds, mediate the recall of actions varying in 
their consistency with established expectancies. These 
data are more consistent with a model of memory_which does 
not assign any necessary causal role to the amount of 
cognitive effort utilized in the processing of these 
actions (e.g., a featural analysis). 
An additional analysis was done to directly address 
the issue of the necessary role of effortful (i.e., 
cognitively demanding) processing within this paradigm. 
For each subject within experimental conditions, an effort 
score was computed at each level of consistency and 
inconsistency. This score was computed by dividing the 
total of their rated effort for each of the recalled 
actions (i.e., the total of the scores they had given each 
item on the effort scale used at input) by the number of 
items recalled by the subject. For example, if the total 
rated effort for low-inconsistent items was 6 for subject 
1, her score in this condition would be "6" if she only 
recalled one low-inconsistent item that she had rated as 6 
on the input form; if subject 2 had a total score of 6 but 
had recalled two low-inconsistent items (e.g., one was 
rated 2 and one was rated 4), her score would be "3". Each 
subject's effort measure and recall score was then entered 
into a linear regression analysis to see whether rated 
effort is related to recall in either condition. According 
to an associative view, rated effort at input should be 
positively correlated with recall. This was not the case; 
the correlation in both conditions was unreliable (r=.08 in 
free recall; r=.03 in cued recall). Thus, how hard an item 
was to explain (i.e., their rated effort) did not predict 
the item's memorability contrary to the assumptions of the 
Hastie, Wyer and Srull model. 
The results of this study suggest that the prevalent 
model used for understanding the effects of expectancy 
confirmation and violation on memory is, at best, 
incomplete. In doing so, the conceptualization of the 
nature of consistency and inconsistency implicit in this 
model may be questioned. 
The utility of these models for understanding 
consistency and inconsistency may be limited for several 
important reasons. One primary reason is that global 
models, such as Ham, were developed for the specific goal 
of constructing operational, comprehensive models of memory 
(Lochman, Lochman, & Butterfield, 1979)- As first 
approximations toward such models, research has been 
confined to stimulus materials which are well-defined in 
terms of their interrelationships (e.g.,-propositional 
content and category membership). The interrelationships 
between social stimuli are not well understood. 
For example, is inconsistency equivalent to 
atypicality? Or is inconsis tency a dimension that is 
largely constrained to social stimuli? 
The primary difference between expectancy inconsistent 
and consistent behaviors is the extent to which processing 
inconsistency entails the increased allocation of 
processing resources. In this sense, expectancy 
inconsistent behaviors are considered to be a part of a 
large class of variables which affect memory via their 
demand for increased processing resources (e.g., hard vs 
easy tasks, Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & Ellis, 1979; scaped 
vs massed presentation of words on a list, Johnson & Uhl, 
1979; elaborative vs nonelaborative orienting tasks, 
Griffith, 1976). As such, the analysis of memory for 
inconsistency relies heavily upon global models of memory 
which have been developed to account for a large body of 
empirical effects (e.g., Ham, Anderson, & Bower, 1976). 
Consider both social and nonsocial category members -
Joe Doe as a "college professor" and Bluie as a bird. 
Certain features define each category. College professors 
have degrees, teach classes and are intelligent. Birds 
have wings, have feathers and are born from eggs. Tweety 
cannot lack these features or have features which directly 
oppose the features of this category (e.g., having live 
birth from a womb) and be in this category. This is not 
true for social categories. Joe Doe can lack a degree, not 
teach and even be dumb and still be a college professor -
he can do things that are both descriptively and 
evaluatively opposite from the features of the category and 
be in the category. In other words, he can be inconsistent 
with his social category. He is not merely an atypical 
member. Although the prevalence of "double-lives" is not 
abundant in society, it is an occurrence which points to 
this dimension of the social world. Deception and attitude 
behavior discrepancies are common in social settings and 
nonexistent in nonsocial domains. 
36 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Anderson, N. H. (1968). Likableness ratings of 555 
personality-trait words. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 3, 272-279. 
Anderson, J. R., & Bower, G. H. (1973). Human associative 
memory. Washington, D.C.: Winson. 
Crocker, J., Hannah, D. B., & Weber, R. (1983). Person 
memory and causal attributions. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 44, 55-66. 
Hamilton, D., Katz, L. B., & Leirer, V. D. ( 1980). 
Organizational processes in impression. In R. Hastie, 
T. M. Ostrom, E. B. Ebbesen, D. L. Hamilton, & D. E. 
Carlston (Eds.), Person memory; Cognitive basis of 
social perception. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Hastie, R. (1980). Memory for information which confirms or 
contradicts a general impression. In R. Hastie, T. M. 
Ostrom, E. B. Ebbesen, R. S. Wyer, D. L. Hamilton, & D. 
E. Carlston (eds.), Person memory: Cognitive basis of 
social perception. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Hastie, R. (1984). Causes and effects of causal 
attribution. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 46, 44-56. 
Hastie, R., & Kumar, P. A. (1979). Person memory: 
Personality traits as organizing principles in memory 
for behaviors. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, J_5, 343-355. 
Hastie, R., Park, B., & Weber, R. (1984). Social memory. 
In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of Social 
Psychology, (Vol. 11). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Hunt, R. R., & Einstein, G. 0. (1981). Relational and item-
specific information in memory. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20, 497-514. 
Hunt, R. R., & Seta, C. E. (1984). Category size effects in 
recall: The roles of relational and individual item 
information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory and Cognition, 10, 454-464. 
37 
Lachman, R.f Lachman, J. L., & Butterfield, R. C. (1979). 
Cognitive psychology and information processing: An 
introduction. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Rothbart, M. Social desirability ratings of 218 behavioral 
descriptions. Unpublished manuscript. 
Rothbart, M., Evans, M., & Fulero, S. (1979). Recall for 
confirming events: Memory processes and the maintenance 
of social stereotypes. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 14, 237-255. 
Seta, C. E., & Hunt, R. R. (1983). Memory for 
prototypically consistent and inconsistent social 
actions. Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the 
Eastern Psychological Association, Philadelphia,~jffpril, 
T9ET. 
Seta, C. E., & Hunt, R. R. (1985). Memory for inconsistent 
social actions. The importance of relational cues. 
Presented to the Annual Meeting of the Southeastern 
Psychological Association"! Atlanta, April 1985. 
Srull, T. K. (1981). Person memory: Some tests of 
associative storage and retrieval models. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human learning and memory, 7, 
440-463. 
Srull, T. K., Lichtenstein, M., & Rothbart, M. (1985). 
Associative storage and retrieval processes in person 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory and Cognition, 11, 316-345. 
Stern, L. D., Marrs, S., Millar, M. G., & Cole, E. (1984). 
Processing time and the recall of inconsistent and 
consistent behaviors of individuals and groups. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47» 253-
2<oT. 
Tyler, S. W., Hertel, P. T., McCallum, M. C., & Ellis, H. C. 
(1979). Cognitive effort and memory. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 5i 
607-617. "" 
Tversky, A. (1977). Features of similarity. Psychological 
Review, 84, 327-352. 
Wyer, R. S., & Gordon, S. E. (1982). The recall of 
information about persons and groups. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 18, 128-164. 
38 
Wyer, R., & Srull, T. K. (1980). The processing of social 
stimulus information: A conceptual integration. In R. 
Hastie, T. M. Ostrom, E. B. Ebbesen, R. S., Wyer, D. L. 
Hamilton, & D. E. Carlston (Eds.) Person memory; 
Cognitive basis of social perception. Hillsdale, N.J.: 
Erlbaum. 
Table 1. Mean explanation ratings : The higher the 
number the less likley to be adequately explained. 
Consistency 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Level low mod high low mod high 
3.25 2.57 2.33 4.65 5.44 6.70 
Table 2. Mean recall scores in experimental and control 
conditions. 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION 
Level low 
free recall 3*44 
Test 
cued recall 2.69 
Consistency 
Consistent 
mod high 
2.81 2.75 
1.94 2.81 
Inconsistent 
low mod high 
2.81 3.06 3.50 
3.00 2.94 1.69 
CONTROL CONDITION 
Consistency 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Level 
free recall 
Test 
cued recall 
low mod high 
3.06 3.44 3.00 
.31 .81 1.37 
low mod high 
3.06 3.25 2.81 
0 0 0 
41 
Table 3. Mean recall scores in experimental condition 
including guessing corrections. 
Consistency 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Level low mod high low mod high 
free recall 3.44 2.81 2.75 2.81 3«06 3*50 
Test 
cued recall 2.69 1.94 2.81 3.00 2.94 1.69 
guessing 
2.38 1.13 1.44 3.00 2.94 1.69 
correction 
